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a transitive and complete betterness relation that incorporates all relevant
aspects or perspectives, there does not seem to be a plausible alternative
to maximizing.
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Don Ross' Economic Theory and Cognitive Science is a challenging, well
thought out book that exhibits considerable understanding of economics,
philosophy, and cognitive science, and deserves to be taken seriously. Its
premise that economics must not only address cognitive science but change
in response to it seems entirely correct, though if current experience is any
indication most economists will realize this only long after the die of
change is cast. Of the many things worth discussing in the book, I will not
address Ross' critique of eliminative materialism and intentional-stance
functionalism alternative (d. Nagel 1986; Searle 1997), his reading of the
history of economics regarding Robbins and Samuelson, his view that
reality boils down to a fundamental unity of one underlying kind of stuff
(d. Dupre 2001), his separateness of economics thesis (d. Hausman 1992),
nor his radical scientific realism and rejection of commonsense ontology
(d. Miiki 1992). I will address what I take to be the pivotal focus of the
book, namely the ontological thesis that human individuals or selves are
not agents but their subpersonal aspects are. I begin with a summary of
Ross' relevant arguments, and then move to their evaluation.
RESCUING NEOCLASSICISM?

Ross seeks to unite the 'core insights of neoclassical economics with
evolutionary cognitive and behavioral science' in a way that abandons
both 'our conventional, "folk" schema for sorting intentional, behavioral
and social reality' (19), and also the traditional assumption that human
individuals or selves are agents. His approach is the opposite of that
recommended by many other advocates of behavioral and evolutionary
economics (e.g. Bowles 2003), who see the new programs as essentially
anti-neoclassical. Ross rejects their position as relying on 'hyperempiricist
methodological principles' and as a misguided attempt to transform
economics into 'a branch of applied social psychology' (28), violating the
purported status of economics as a separate science. Rather he argues that
'the core neoclassical commitment to economics as the systematic science
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of maximization under scarcity comports better with the most sophisticated
philosophy of cognitive science than does emphasis on unsystematic
hyperempiricism' (29). Thus he offers an 'updating and defense of
neoclassicism in the light of cognitive science', though allows that his
picture will 'look strikingly different from the one usually associated with
neoclassicism, and will jettison a number of theses to which neoclasSicists
are widely regarded as committed', including that individual people
generally are rational maximizers of expected utility, individualism, and
that people are generally selfish (28). Indeed evolutionary dynamics will
carry greater weight in explaining economic behavior than any deliberate
rational calculation carried out by individual economic agents.
Ross also rejects an internalist view of mental states and intentionality,
and approaches propositional attitudes in a functionalist manner (rather
than in an eliminative materialist way) . The 'Dennettian package' or
intentional-stance functionalism Ross relies on seeks to explain (not
dissolve) consciousness and the self with~ut appeal to intrinsic meaning
by offering an account of propositional attitudes in terms of 'triangulated
regularities among a subject, features of her environment, and patterns of
expectations of her interpreters' (49). Thus, if in a traditional folk psychology manner one wants to attribute desires and beliefs to a given agent,
then foregoing an internalist approach means one focuses on the 'network
of social facts about language and a standing set of behavioral regularities'
associated with agents (53). From a mereological perspective (seeing reality
as a unity of one kind of underlying stuff), the issue for an intentionalstance functionalism is whether one can carry out a progressive mereological Simplification (in the intertheoretic but not reductionist sense) that
treats propositional attitudes as descriptions of patterns of social communication. Key here for Ross is Shannon's (1948) treatment of information
in physically measurable terms, such that economics advances in tandem
with cognitive science as a formal theory of information and computation.
Economics' claim to be a separate science, then, is not a matter of its
investigation of a distinctive set of causal regularities, but rather a matter of
how Robbins' definition of economics can be combined with Samuelson's
revealed preference theory (RPT), minus Robbins' introspectionism. The
beauty of RPT for Ross is that it has nothing to do 'descriptively with
any real empirical agents' (107). Thus, Robbins' definition of economics as
the science that studies human behavior as a relation between ends and
scarce means which have alternative uses stands once the term 'human'
is dropped (87). This gives the distinctive Robbins-Samuelson argument
pattern (RASP).
Ross goes on to agree with me (Davis 2003) that 'if the ontology of
mainstream economics is to be defended, somebody has to provide a new
concept of what an economic agent is' (111), while disagreeing with me
that any anthropocentric view of the agent as an individual human being
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is possible (157). Indeed, Ross wants to 'eliminate individualism from
economic theory proper without at the same time eliminating agents and
individual selves from our wider ontology' (111).
Ross' argument is built up from Daniel Dennett's 'multiple-drafts
model' (MDM) theory of consciousness. On this view, brains are massive
parallel processors, and as Ross puts it are like national economies, for
which the key to their stability of response is the coordination of large
amounts of distributed information processing without recourse to any
centralized executive command function or central site in the brain where
everything comes together. 'Aspects of complex problems have to be
handled in parallel by distributed teams of subagents, and these teams
have to be partially encapsulated from each other with respect to their
sharing of information' (235), such that the brain ends up producing
multiple drafts of a succession of partial solutions, indeed so as to often
'solve' problems at ineffective levels of abstraction. Further, as there is no
self-as-executive, when this on-going process is pushed by the world to
report or act, some subset or part of the overall information processing
gets privileged ('selected for fame' in Dennett's words), and interpreted
as the current content of consciousness. This interpretation or judgment
is moreover not a report of the individual's internal states, but involves a
'triangulation among external conditions, proprioperceptive signals, overall behavioral track record, and expectations' (236) regarding whatever
occasioned the report or action, and in intentional stance terms is a matter
of the subject reflexively taking an intentional stance toward herself.
From this Ross rejects an Aristotelianism that takes human beings
as prototypical agents, with Becker's 'anthropocentric neoclassicism' as
its best expression in economics (154). Agents are rather defined in
Samuelsonian RPT terms as:
any system that observes certain consistency conditions in behavior, such
that it can be interpreted as if it is maximizing the value of a function
that maps a system of preferences over commodity bundles onto the real
numbers. (245)

Ross uses as two defences of this: the money-pump idea and the idea that
something must be constant when systems are in continual adjustment
to their environment. On the first, 'agents' with cyclical preferences
'disappear from the market as economic agents' (246). The latter idea,
servosystematicity - control of a local entropy through sensitivity to negative
feedback - is fundamental to the concept of agency, and has become
increasingly emphasized across the cognitive sciences. (248)

I return to these two rationales in my evaluation below.
Behavior of simple biolOgical individuals that can be individuated
genetically, such as insects, ideally fits the description of an economic
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agent for Ross because of their hard-wired character. In contrast, sOcial
animals need to solve highly complicated coordination games that are
evolutionary in nature, and as they are drawn into such games they are
forced to become more and more sophisticated economic agents. Thus
complex sociality is negatively correlated with Samuelsonian econOmic
agency, as manifest in such phenomena as preference reversals and time
inconsistency. Indeed, the very idea of a person cannot be Robinson Crusoe
because it presupposes this social embeddedness (313). As people become
increasingly complex and social, and can less and less be represented
in terms of Samuelsonian economic agency, they make increasing use of
evolved public signaling systems - 'external scaffolding' (286) - of which
public language is the most important form.
The agents in economics, then, are human beings' subpersonal
aspects that can be said to behave according to RASP. Ross treats as
paradigmatic Glimcher's (2003) neuroeconomics account of individuals
made up of subpersonal agents in terms of brain modules and Ainslie's
(2001) picoeconomics account of individuals' divergent subpersonal shortrange and long-range interests engaged in repeated prisoner's dilemma
bargaining games, and integrated with one another through processes like
political log-rolling among shifting coalitions. Emphasizing Ainslie, Ross
states his own 'book's central thesis' to be 'what a person is: a set of basically
compatible long-range interests that have co-opted a sufficient army of
short-range interests into their coalition to maintain stable equilibrium'
(351). In Ross' game theoretic understanding of this, human beings'
subpersonal agents play evolutionary games with one another. .
Human beings, then, are communities of these subpersonal RASP
agents (like nations in traditional neoclassical analysis) or 'complex
assemblies of servosystematic architectures' (256). Dennett's MDM theory
of consciousness and intentional-stance functionalism enters into this
picture when a human being with the no seU-as-executive happens to
privilege some subpersonal agent or coalition of agents 'within' herself
when in (evolutionary game theoretic) interaction with other human
beings similarly privileging some subpersonal agent or coalition of
agents 'within' themselves. This brings about adjustment in each person's
subpersonal agent coalitions and privileging of particular subpersonal
agents (or coalitions of them), so that evolutionary games between people
interact with evolutionary games 'within' people.
In contrast to standard thinking, then, the games subpersonal agents
play are the subject of microeconomics (the subject of this book), whereas
the games whole human beings play with one another are the subject
of macroeconomics (the subject of Ross' forthcoming sequel). But as
individuals are changed in their interaction with one another, changing
their internal interaction of subpersonal selves, and as their subpersonal
interaction also changes their interaction with one another, neither the
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interior and exterior boundaries of the person, nor the boundaries between
macroeconomics and microeconomics are stable.
Finally, the way we see human beings is as continually engaged
in constructing their selves by reflexively taking the intentional stance
toward themselves. For Ross, this recalls Taylor (1989) and Williams
(1976) who see individuals as constantly writing their own biographies
as coherent narratives, though Ross emphasizes that because people do
this in interaction with others, as authors of their own selves people have
multiple co-authors.
RESCUING THE INDIVIDUAL?

I agree with Ross that the unity of the individual needs to be accounted for,
is not accounted for in neoclassical economics, and that accounting for the
unity of individual needs to be understood in terms of the social interaction
of individuals or social embeddedness. Where I disagree with him is in
regard to how individuals' subpersonal selves are to be understood and
then related to the individual human being as a whole.
Ross's argument is that human beings as complexes of subpersonal
aspects are not themselves agents, as evidenced by such things as
preference reversals and time inconsistency, but their subpersonal aspects
are agents because they are Samuelsonian rational maximizers, who by
definition cannot exhibit such things as preference reversals and time
inconsistency. Assuming for the moment, that the subpersonal aspects of
people are agents, why should they be thought of as Samuelsonian agents?
In his defence of this claim, Ross gives two criteria for being an agent:
not being a money pump, or the idea of not being the source of one's
own destruction, and servosystematicy, or the idea of a core of stability
in the face of adjustment to one's environment. The basis for the first is
the intuition that the idea of an agent money pump is self-contradictory.
Logically this makes sense, but it also makes sense to imagine there
exist agents guided by principles that ultimately insure their destruction,
but only after some perhaps lengthy period during which they exhibit
activity and plausibly act as agents. So agents need not necessarily be
Samuelsonian agents. The intuition behind the servosystematicity idea
is that unstable response to the environment changes what the agent is,
and thus makes it difficult to re-identify the agent across change. Yes,
but that Samuelsonian agents have stable preferences does not reflect
servosystematicity because there is no 'control of a local entropy through
sensitivity to negative feedback' (246) in such an agent. The agent is simply
abstracted from the environment, as Ross makes clear in emphasizing
the logical, non-agent specific character of RPT. So neither need agents
be Samuelsonian, nor do Samuelsonian agents qualify as agents in the
servosystematic sense.
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Separately, Ross accepts my argument that vary Becker fails to show
that individuals can be understood in terms of utility functions (157,
187) as well as my location of this failure in a replication of Locke's
circular argument for personal identity (225). But then how are subpersonal
Samuelsonian agents to be identified in terms of their utility functions?
Let us, however, back up the truck, and ask a question that precedes
asking why agents should be seen as Samuelsonian, namely, why should
the subpersonal aspects of people be thought to be agents at all? It begs the
question to say that the subpersonal aspects of people are agents because
they have utility functions, because that is Ross' definition of an agent. Ross
needs to be able to say these subpersonal aspects are agents, and then assign
them utility functions. His best argument, it seems, would be to claim that
the subpersonal aspects of people are servosystematic. But while he makes
a case for saying that insects and other hard-wired simple creatures might
be genetically individuated as servosystematic systems, the case does not
seem to have been made for the subpersonal aspects of people. Nor is
it clear that the two paradigmatic figures ~oss discusses in this regard,
Glimcher (2003) and Ainslie (2001), have made the case in terms of brain
modules and short-range and long-range interests respectively. Neuroscience extensively discusses transference of functions across areas of the
brain, often accompanied by modification of function. How does one individuate a brain module then? Short-range and long-range interests might
be individuated in general by time frame, but does this take us very far in
terms of individuating particular short-range and long-range interests?
If Ross does not make the case for the subpersonal aspects of people being agents, then does the dreaded Aristotelian view that the human being
is the prototypical agent get rehabilitated by default? Ross inadvertently
opens the door to such a view by allowing that human beings are like countries, which if lacking a clear principle of individuation, are nonetheless
taken as some sort of units. Indeed, on a more charitable view of money
pump agent idea and with creative application of the servosystematicity
idea, countries might well be agents. Then why not human individuals,
who are like countries? If the case is not made that agents must be
Samuelsonian agents, then the case is not made that agents cannot exhibit
preference reversals and time inconsistency, which Ross believes cognitive
science has successfully shown to be the case for human individuals.
I agree with Ross, however, that much remains to be done to explain
what the unity of the human individual consists in, or indeed the extent
to which the human individual can be thought a unity. At the same
time, the way forward in this regard might not involve the strategy Ross
recommends. He seems to me to be right to argue that seeing interaction
between people as evolutionary games impacts on the interaction 'within'
individuals between their different subpersonal aspects, and vice versaand that the boundary between microeconomics and macroeconomics, as
he understands these domains, is porous. But if social interaction impacts
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the evolutionary games within individuals, why doesn't this also impact
what the different subpersonal aspects of the person are? Why, that is, are
there atoms or atomistic individuals within the space of the person, just
as there are atoms or atomistic individuals in the space of the economy
in neoclassicism? Or putting this the other way around, if Ross believes
social interaction precludes the standard neoclassical idea that whole
persons have stable preferences, shouldn't he also say that interaction
between a person's different subpersonal aspects precludes there being
stable preferences for subpersonal 'agents'?
I previously suggested a different strategy for a way forward that
targets neoclassicism's historic commitment to subjectivism (Davis 2003)
in a way recalling Ross' critique of internalism. That strategy, it seems, goes
further toward erasing the boundary between what Ross understands as
microeconomics and macroeconomics by taking the subpersonal aspects
of the individual not as specific to the individual but as inescapably social
in the form of the individuals' multiple social affiliations, social identities,
social group locations, and social positions. The argument, then, is that the
unity of the individual needs to be understood as a capability that might
obtain for the individual for transiting across these social subpersonal
aspects. But these social subpersonal aspects are not atoms nor simply
other individual agents, as in neoclassical market theory, but only different
social settings. This approach does not seem too distantly removed from
Ross's approach as it might seem. Thus, despite the differences discussed
here, I am sympathetic to what I take to be the goals of Ross' argument. And
in any event, I strongly recommend his book for its serious engagement
with economics' encounter with cognitive science.

John B. Davis
University of Amsterdam and Marquette University

REFERENCES

Ainslie, G. 2001. Picoeconomics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bowles, S. 2003. Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Davis, J. 2003. The Theory of the Individual in Economics. London: Routledge.
Dupre, J. 2001. Human Natllre and the Limits of Science. Oxford University Press.
Glimcher, P.W. 2003. Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain. MIT Press.
Hands, W. 2005. Introspection, revealed preference and the explanatory potential of
neoclassical economics: a critical response to Don Ross on the Robbins-Samuelson
Argument Pattern (RASP) or how I learned to stop worrying and love rational choice
theory. Unpublished.
Hausman, D. 1992. The In exact and Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge University Press.
Miiki, U. 1992. Friedman and realism . Research in the History of Economic Thought and
MethodologJ) 4:127-43.
Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. 1997. The Construction of Social Reality. Free Press.

252

REVIEWS

Shannon, C. 1948. The m athematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal
27:37-423, 623- 56.
Taylor 1989. The Sources of the Self. Cambridge University Press.
Williams, B. 1976. Persons, character, and morality. In The Identities of Persons, ed . A. Rorty,
184-205. University of California Press.

doi:10.1017/ S0266267107001411

William Stanley Jevons and the Making of Modern Economics, by Harro Maas.
Cambridge University Press, 2005, xxii+330 pages.
Harro Maas's book on Jevons is an extremely impressive piece of
scholarship - one more than deserving of the Joseph J. Spengler Book
Award it recently received from the History of Economics Society. It is
well researched, engagingly written, and overall very persuasive.
The book is not a biography of Jevons in the traditional, birth to grave,
sense. Maas draws heavily on Jevons's intellectual and social context, but
it would not be fair to call the book science studies, since it has neither the
site-specific focus of micro-constructivist studies nor the interest-based
explanatory strategy of more macro-sociological studies. If it must be
labeled, I would call it historical epistemology - an effort to understand
how and why Jevons came to consider certain theoretical propositions to
be knowledge as a result of his particular personal experiences and general
intellectual context.
The central thesis is that Jevons's approach to economic theory both in his landmark Theory of Political Economy (TPE) and in other,
more applied, research on various economic subjects - was based on at
least four, fundamentally intertwined, commitments. First, a nineteenthcentury British notion of mathematics: an applied-scientific notion that tied
mathematics inexorably to practical, particularly physics-based, problems.
Second, a statistical conception of scientific explananda - where the
phenomena to be explained, and the scientific laws that provide the
explanations, concern averages and not specific individual events or
observations. Third, a commitment to mechanical analogy as an adequate,
perhaps the only adequate, scientific mode of understanding. To build
a mechanical model, or to capture the essential characteristics of some
phenomenon in such a model, was, for Jevons, sufficient for rational
intelligibility. Finally, and the point that seems to receive the most
attention from the author, Jevons's belief in the substantive identity of
the sciences of mind (moral science) and the sciences of matter (physical
science). For Jevons, human consciousness was subject to the same type
of scientific inquiry that characterized the physical sciences: 'There was
no longer any categorical distinction .. . between mind and machines'
(p. 138). This view distinguished Jevons from those like John Stuart Mill
who endorsed a science of mind, but maintained that such a science would

